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Within healthcare ethics and public health ethics, it has been the custom that medical and public health interventions should adhere to the principle of the least restrictive means. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I provide a short introduction to the concept of the least intrusive means within healthcare ethics ad public health ethics and present the intervention ladder proposed by the Nuffield Council of Bioethics. In Section 3, I argue that the intervention ladder exemplifies a quantitative interpretation of the least restrictive means. In Section 4, I introduce and develop a qualitative interpretation of the principle of the least restrictive means 1 based on the capability approach. In Section 5, I present and discuss three objections to the intervention ladder and the quantitative interpretation that it exemplifies. Finally, in Section 6, I argue that unlike either of the quantitative interpretations, the qualitative, capabilitybased interpretation of the least restrictive means can address all of the three objections raised against the intervention ladder.
| THE LE A S T RE S TRI C TIVE ME AN S AND THE INTERVENTI ON L ADDER
In order to curb the spread of infectious diseases, public health pro- namely proportionality and least infringement. 5 The condition of proportionality holds that in the context of a measure that promotes public health yet infringes on some more general moral consideration -such as individual autonomy, privacy, confidentiality or prior government promises -it must be shown that 'the probable public health benefits outweigh the infringed general moral considerations'. 6 In other words, it must be shown that the infringement is proportional to the benefit to public health: isolating someone with a common cold for days would not usually be considered a proportionate response because of the low cost of treating the common cold and the low risk it poses to public health. If a public health measure meets the condition of proportionality, and can be shown to be the kind of measure that is both effective and necessary to address the particular public health concern, the least infringement condition then holds that the degree to which a general moral consideration is infringed should be to the lowest degree consistent with achieving the public health goal. In other words, because, or insofar as, we regard individuals to have the capacity for self-determination, we ought to protect their freedom to make autonomous choices. Thus, at the core of the principle of the least restrictive means is a commitment to reduce the impact of public health measures on individual freedom to the least extent necessary or possible.
How can the principle of the least restrictive means be put into practice? How can it help us to evaluate actual public health measures? One influential instantiation of the principle of the least restrictive means, and the normative value of autonomy, is the 'intervention ladder', proposed by the Nuffield Council of Bioethics.
12 Table 1 presents an adapted version of the intervention ladder that applies it to the context of infectious disease control.
The ladder should be read in the following way, according to the authors. At the bottom of the ladder, we find the least restrictive alternative, namely to do nothing or simply monitor the situation. This is the least restrictive means because it does not involve any restrictions on the autonomous choice of the individual. Moving up the ladder, the higher rungs aim to increasingly influence the choice of the individual by providing additional information, guidance, incentives and disincentives. At the top of the ladder, we find the most restrictive means, which involve, first, a decrease in alternative options and, finally, the complete elimination of choice.
The higher up the ladder one goes, it is argued, the stronger the justification of the implemented means needs to be. might agree that a tax on junk food is too restrictive out of a normative concern for equality, they might be less inclined to object to the ban on sugary drinks in public institutions because, ex hypothesi, buying sugary drinks does not constitute a valuable choice in and of itself. Moreover, and contrary to the preferred option on the quantitative interpretation, insofar as a healthy lifestyle is arguably a valuable choice and insofar as public-awareness campaigns are less effective at promoting healthy lifestyles, proponents of the qualitative interpretation might object to such interventions because they risk interfering with individuals' actual freedom to achieve a healthy lifestyle, for example by not addressing personal obstacles, such as akrasia, or structural issues, such as socioeconomic inequalities, which are important drivers of obesity.
This raises the question that I will address in the remainder of this paper: when push comes to shove, should public health professionals prioritize the concern for the amount of alternative choices that people have (i.e., the quantitative interpretation) or the concern for whether the choices that people have represent valuable options (i.e., the qualitative interpretation) when choosing between alternative public health measures?
In the following two sections I introduce and discuss these two interpretations in greater detail and show how the intervention ladder exemplifies the quantitative interpretation. In Section 5, I argue that the overlap with the quantitative interpretation makes the intervention ladder vulnerable to three objections that, as I argue in Section 6, only can be addressed by adopting the qualitative interpretation of the least restrictive means.
| THE QUANTITATIVE INTERPRE TATI ON OF THE LE A S T RE S TRIC TIVE ME AN S
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If we take autonomy to be the primary moral concern, in this way, the quantitative interpretation is intuitively attractive because it aims to leave as much opportunity for autonomous choice as possible. Consider, for example, two public health measures that constrain the social interactions of an individual carrier of an infectious disease in order to prevent contamination. Both measures allow that the carrier can be with his family but bar him from certain public spaces. However, while the first measure only restricts our carrier from going to work, the second measure additionally prevents him from visiting his friends. If we are concerned with the individual carrier's autonomy, we should, on the quantitative interpretation, say that the first measure is the least restrictive measure since it allows him greater freedom to exercise his autonomy: whereas the first measure allows our carrier to choose between two options of social interaction (family, friends), the second measure only allows one, namely being with his family.
I have claimed that the intervention ladder (table 1) , which I briefly introduced in the previous section, exemplifies quantitative interpretation of the principle of least restrictive means. How is this?
Ignoring the bottom rung, which does not aim to make any restrictions, the intervention ladder applies the quantitative interpretation of the least restrictive means in two analytically distinct, but, in practice, overlapping ways.
First, the lower rungs on the intervention ladder (rungs 3-7) work by increasing the degree to which the means aim to guide individuals to choose a preferred option, without directly enforcing this choice. is the enforcement of a particular choice, such as mandatory vaccines, because it leaves no alternative options to be chosen. qualitative interpretation of the least restrictive means. In the next section, I proceed to introduce this qualitative interpretation.
| A QUALITATIVE , C APAB ILIT Y-BA S ED INTERPRE TATI ON OF THE LE A S T RE S TRIC TIVE ME ANS
The least restrictive means in quantitative terms is not always the measure that is the most desirable, neither from a public health perspective nor from the point of view of individual agents. In the first case, as argued, less restrictive means might be less effective to achieve public health aims than interventions that interfere more Crucially, the capability approach takes a multidimensional and pluralistic view of freedom and well-being. 19 An individual can be affected by a particular public health measure in different ways.
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For example, the isolation of infected patients may not only affect their freedom to move around, but also their ability to engage in social relations and participate in recreational activities. Likewise, two different individuals may experience different impacts from the same public health measure. Someone who is less socially active would be less affected by being isolated from friends and family than someone who values social relations higher.
By focusing on what people are able to do or be (i.e., their capabilities), the capability approach aims to broaden the informational basis of traditional behavioural models and evaluative accounts. 21 What is missing from these models, according to Sen, is an account of how people value the different choices that they have and what makes certain freedoms more valuable or normatively important than others. As Sen argues, a singular concern with the quantity of freedoms that individuals have would be unsustainable because it would:
… be then possible to assess the freedom of a person independently of -or prior to -the assessment of alternatives between which the person can choose … It is odd to conclude that the freedom of a person is no less when she has to choose between three alternatives which she sees respectively as 'bad', 'awful', and 'gruesome' than when she has the choice between three alternatives which she assesses as 'good', 'excellent', and 'superb'. In the following I argue that the quantitative interpretation (and, hence, the intervention ladder) is subject to these three objections and show how they can be addressed by adopting the qualitative interpretation of the least restrictive means. framework that can be further specified into more particular capability theories. 30 While the capability approach at its core is normatively committed to conceptualize people's well-being in terms of their real freedom to do or be certain things, when developing a particular capability theory -such as a capabilitarian interpretation of the least restrictive means -it is necessary to take other normative concerns into consideration, such as equality, equity and efficiency. In other words, neither the capability approach in general nor its more specific capability theories are exclusively concerned with individual freedom.
| THREE OBJEC TI ON S TO THE QUANTITATIVE INTERPRE TATI ON

| Concern for other values than freedom
Secondly, the capability approach acknowledges that people are not only concerned with their individual freedom, but also other values, such as fairness, equality, equity and efficiency. What this means for the interpretation of the least restrictive means is that it cannot simply be reduced to the measure that restricts individual freedom to the least extent, measured in quantitative terms as a range of options or choices. Rather, if we care about these additional values, the least restrictive means would be the one that is most cost efficient in terms of balancing individual freedom and effectiveness or the one that preserves the most equal amount of freedom among affected individuals.
| Some freedom-restricting interventions are necessary to protect valuable freedoms
The second objection points out that not all interventions restrict the range of options that individuals are free to choose from. 31 For example, as on rungs 6 and 7, the enabling of choice, by providing additional options, and the provision of information seem actually to enhance the freedom of the individuals. Offering access to eradication treatment is not antithetical to individual freedom of choice.
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In fact, it provides infected individuals with a greater freedom to combat their disease -an opportunity that they might not have, or only would have had to a lesser extent, had this access not been provided.
It might be argued that the above example only shows that the relevant kind of intervention is one that also entails some interfer- Proponents of the quantitative version of the intervention ladder could respond to this in two ways. First, they could argue that they are primarily or merely concerned with protecting negative freedom (i.e., the freedom from being interfered with) but that the above example shows a gain in positive freedom (i.e., the freedom to vaccinate). The subsidy provided still constitutes a more restrictive means since it aims to interfere with the autonomous choice of individuals.
Secondly, it is doubtful whether interventions higher up the ladder -providing disincentives and the removal of choices -enhance individual (positive) freedom in this way. For example, providing a disincentive, such as a fine, does not, as we saw in the previous section, enhance the freedom of less affluent individuals to vaccinate -quite the opposite, in fact.
We can likewise respond to these amendments in two ways.
First of all, it is wholly implausible to reduce individual freedom to only concern the negative aspects freedom, ignoring the gain in positive freedom. For example, for someone to have the negative freedom to choose between vaccinating or not (i.e., no one will interfere with this choice), they would also need to have the positive freedom to vaccinate. Since, in the above example, the positive freedom to vaccinate only became available to the lower-income individuals qua the proposed subsidy, their negative freedom from being interfered with when choosing whether or not to vaccinate only became available as a result of the subsidy. It would be absurd to claim that the lower-income individuals in the example were free, negatively speaking, to vaccinate as long as no one would interfere with this choice if the option to vaccinate did not, positively speaking, appear in their range of options to choose from.
Secondly, the point here is not to show how all public health measures lead to more freedom, but rather to show that some interferences with autonomous choices actually lead to more freedom. In sum, the three objections discussed in this section point to important aspects that need to be taken into account when setting out public health measures and which the quantitative interpretation, as exemplified by the intervention ladder, cannot satisfy. Hence, any alternative interpretation of the principle of the least restrictive means should be able to address these three objections. I have argued that the qualitative, capability-based interpretation of the least restrictive means can meet this challenge.
| ADDRE SS ING T WO OBJEC TI ON S TO THE QUALITATIVE INTERPRE TATI ON
Even if the qualitative interpretation can address these three objections, it is possible to raise two additional objections to it. First, it might be objected that, by focusing on certain normatively valuable 33 Ibid.
34 Sen, A. (1988) . Freedom of choice: Concept and content. European Economic Review, , 269-294. freedoms, the qualitative interpretation ignores the quantitative aspect of freedom and autonomy. That is, this objection correctly argues, the extent to which a public health measure leaves room for autonomous choice -both in terms of range of choices as well as in terms of non-interference -also matters for how we should evaluate it. If this is true, the focus of the qualitative interpretation, the objection concludes, is misguided or at least incomplete.
While the observation that the amount of autonomous choice one has matters for the evaluation of public health measures is indeed true, it fails as an objection to the qualitative interpretation.
The reason for this is that that the qualitative interpretation does not hold that the quantity of freedom is irrelevant, only that the least restrictive means cannot be reduced to the measure that protects the highest amount of choices or, conversely, restricts the least amount of choices. What the notions of capabilities and functionings highlight, is that in order for someone to have the real (or what is sometimes called substantive) freedom to do or be something, it is necessary also to provide certain positive conditions. In other words, in order properly to conceptualize the least restrictive means, it is insufficient merely to look at how much or how little public health measures interfere with the freedom of individuals. We also need to look at the extent to which these measures (fail to) provide the positive conditions necessary for the exercise of this freedom and whether these freedoms are normatively relevant or valuable.
Second, proponents of the quantitative interpretation might object that they are not merely concerned with the amount of freedom that people have. That is, they might argue, non-quantitative judgments are inescapable when conducting normative analyses about the relative weight to be given to different public health measures.
Recall, for example, the case of obesity in Section 2 and how proponents of the quantitative interpretation might take concerns for equality (i.e., taxes on junk food unequally affect the choices of less affluent individuals) into consideration when deciding on appropriate measures to address obesity.
Although this example indeed shows how the quantitative interpretation of the least restrictive means can take qualitative concerns into account, this concern can still be reduced to a quantitative concern, namely a concern that the amount of freedom of some individuals is reduced, rather than a concern with the actual qualitative notion of social and economic equality. An actual concern for socioeconomic equality might lead public health professionals to accept a loss in individual freedom of choice, but proponents of the qualitative interpretation are not ready to make this sacrifice. Thus, they face a dilemma. On the one hand, they can insist, as I argued in Section 5, that the quantitative interpretation includes a ceteris paribus-clause, holding that only after taking all things into consideration should we choose the measure that is quantitatively superior, in which case the quantitative interpretation is actually not a quantitative position because it gives priority and precedence to qualitative concerns. On the other hand, avoiding this reduction into a qualitative interpretation, the proponents of the quantitative interpretation could reaffirm the commitment to prioritize the concern for individual freedom of choice by insisting that the least restrictive means is the one that protects the largest amount of individual options or, conversely, restricts the least amount of alternative choices.
Accordingly, I contend that we should adopt a qualitative interpretation of the least restrictive means. While both interpretations are concerned with the value of freedom, the qualitative interpretation holds that the infringement of public health measures on individual autonomy should first and foremost be measured, not in terms of the amount of overall freedom that they restrict, but rather in terms of whether certain valuable freedoms are infringed upon.
Taking into account the quality of the freedoms that individuals have to choose from better reflects the values that are at stake when implementing public health measures, including the general moral considerations that Childress et al. highlight, and might even be more reflective of actual public health practice in which public health professionals and decision makers do put such non-quantitative concerns front and centre. 37 Moreover, it provides a rebuke to the libertarian strand of public health ethics and policy.
Lastly, it should be noted that I have not here investigated whether this qualitative, capability-based interpretation is compatible with the intervention ladder or whether it entails that we should abandon the ladder as an illustration of the least restrictive means.
However, as Dawson concludes, 'if we count more than liberty as relevant, we cannot use the intervention ladder'. 38 I will let it be subject to further research whether this holds true and, if so, how to best represent a qualitative, capability-based interpretation of the least restrictive means. 
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